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Abstract
Background: Since the declaration of the 10th Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in DRC on 1st Aug 2018, several
neighboring countries have been developing and implementing preparedness efforts to prevent EVD cross-border
transmission to enable timely detection, investigation, and response in the event of a confirmed EVD outbreak in
the country. We describe Uganda’s experience in EVD preparedness.
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Results: On 4 August 2018, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) activated the Public Health Emergency
Operations Centre (PHEOC) and the National Task Force (NTF) for public health emergencies to plan, guide, and
coordinate EVD preparedness in the country. The NTF selected an Incident Management Team (IMT), constituting a
National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) that supported activation of the District Task Forces (DTFs) and District Rapid
Response Teams (DRRTs) that jointly assessed levels of preparedness in 30 designated high-risk districts
representing category 1 (20 districts) and category 2 (10 districts). The MoH, with technical guidance from the
World Health Organisation (WHO), led EVD preparedness activities and worked together with other ministries and
partner organisations to enhance community-based surveillance systems, develop and disseminate risk
communication messages, engage communities, reinforce EVD screening and infection prevention measures at
Points of Entry (PoEs) and in high-risk health facilities, construct and equip EVD isolation and treatment units, and
establish coordination and procurement mechanisms.
Conclusion: As of 31 May 2019, there was no confirmed case of EVD as Uganda has continued to make significant
and verifiable progress in EVD preparedness. There is a need to sustain these efforts, not only in EVD preparedness
but also across the entire spectrum of a multi-hazard framework. These efforts strengthen country capacity and
compel the country to avail resources for preparedness and management of incidents at the source while
effectively cutting costs of using a “fire-fighting” approach during public health emergencies.
Keywords: Ebola, Viral Haemorrhagic fever, Epidemic preparedness, Disease outbreaks, Global Health security,
Uganda
Background
A week after declaring the end of the 9th Ebola Virus
Disease (EVD) outbreak in Equateur province of the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on July 24th,
2018, the Ministry of Health of the DRC confirmed a
new EVD outbreak in the Eastern DRC, North Kivu
province on August 1, 2018 [1]. Six health zones, includ-
ing Beni, Butembo, Oicha, Mabalako, and Musienene in
North-Kivu province, and Mandima in Ituri province
have since reported confirmed and probable EVD cases.
Within a month, 122 EVD cases (91 confirmed, 31 prob-
able), including 82 deaths (67% case-fatality rate) had
been reported with an additional nine suspected cases
pending laboratory testing for EVD [2]. North Kivu
province shares borders with Uganda in the east, and
there is frequent cross-border movement due to trade,
farming, healthcare, and social activities. In addition,
North Kivu and Ituri provinces have been the centre of
interethnic clashes for some time now, and harbor over
a million displaced persons, with active rebel activities
causing prolonged insecurity. Since December 2018,
there has been a continuous influx of refugees into
Uganda, resulting in a high risk of EVD introduction
into the country.
EVD is a severe, often fatal illness in humans. Initial
human infection with Ebola virus (EBOV) occurs
through contact with an infected animal, such as a fruit
bat or non-human primate [3]. The virus spreads from
person to person via direct contact with the blood or
body fluids of an EBOV-infected symptomatic person or
dead body. Entry of the body fluids (urine, saliva, sweat,
faeces, vomit, breast milk, vaginal fluid, and semen)
through broken skin or mucous membranes in the eyes,
nose, or mouth can lead to infection [4].
The spread of Ebola Zaire strain can be effectively pre-
vented through vaccination, as demonstrated by a ring
vaccination trial held in Guinea during the 2014 West
African EVD outbreak [5]. Guinea was the epicenter and
the initial site of the largest-ever EVD outbreak, leading
to intense transmission in Guinea as well as the neigh-
bouring countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Transmis-
sion to neighbouring countries was associated with ill-
prepared health systems and poor inter-governmental
coordination, factors that led to poor disease surveil-
lance, insufficient infection prevention and control and
clinical care. Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone had a
long history of socio-economic underdevelopment due
to civil conflict leading to very weak and severely under-
resourced health systems. The outbreak was further ex-
acerbated by infected persons crossing the highly porous
borders of the countries involved [5, 6]. As a result, this
outbreak caused significant mortality, with reported
case-fatality rates of up to 70%.
EVD outbreaks have also occurred in the central Afri-
can nations of Gabon (1995–96, 2001), the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) (1976, 1977, 1995, 2007, 2008,
2012, 2014, 2017, 2018), Sudan(2004), and Uganda
(2000, 2007, 2011, 2012) [7, 8]. Uganda’s largest docu-
mented EVD outbreak occurred in 2000–2001 in Gulu
District, registering 425 cases and 224 deaths [9]. In this
paper, we describe Uganda’s experience in preparedness
to prevent EVD introduction into the country and limit
its spread in case of an outbreak. The approach adopted
by the country focused on comprehensively addressing
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objectives of epidemic preparedness and reponse, includ-
ing anticipation/prediction so that epidemics do not
occur, early detection, and rapid and effective response.
Methods
The epidemic preparedness process constituted all the
activities that were undertaken by MoH and its partners
from national to health facility levels to enable readiness
to effective response to EVD outbreak in Uganda from
August 2018 when EVD outbreak was declared in the
DRC to the time of writing this paper. The reports of
the National Task Force (NTF) and its subcommittees
were reviewed to inform the content of the paper.
Results
The preparedness efforts included activation of coordin-
ation mechanisms, functionalising subcommittees of the
NTF, classifying districts by risk level and conducting
risk assessment and mapping exercise which informed
development of the national EVD response plan. To as-
sess the country readiness, a major simulation exercise
was conducted.
Activation of the PHEOC, NTF, and DTFs
The MoH activated the Public Health Emergency Oper-
ations Centre (PHEOC), NTF and District Task Forces
(DTFs) for coordination of the EVD preparedness. The
NTF is multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary in nature
and comprises key ministries, agencies, and departments
as well as partners and relevant stakeholders and works
through its subcommittees (Fig. 1).
The NTF which is chaired by the Director General of
Health Services and co-chaired by WHO, held an urgent
meeting on the 2nd of August 2018 to discuss EVD pre-
paredness and prevention of spillover from DRC into
Uganda. The NTF developed a multi-agency Incident
Management System (IMS) to coordinate preparedness
efforts and guide central and field EVD activities. The
major IMS components are command and management
of preparedness activities, resource management, com-
munication, and information management. The NTF
assigned an Incident Management Commander (IMC)
and team, made of 6 technical subcommittee team leads
encompassing the eleven key WHO EVD preparedness
components, including: 1) epidemiological surveillance
(contact tracing, capacities at PoEs, and laboratory in-
corporated); 2) case management and Infection Preven-
tion and Control (IPC) including psycho-social support,
waste management and safe and dignified burials; 3) risk
communication and community engagement; 4) vaccin-
ation, therapeutics, and research; 5) emergency coordin-
ation including budgeting and resource mobilisation;
and 6) logistics [10]. The IMT was responsible for plan-
ning and managing preparedness resources and activ-
ities, guiding activity implementation through the DTFs,
and reporting back progress from each district to the
NTF. After the initial risk assessment, 20 districts bor-
dering North Kivu and Ituri provinces were categorized
as high-risk for EVD importation, 10 as moderate-risk,
and the remaining districts as low-risk. Through the
IMS, all 20 high-risk and 10 moderate-risk districts were
supported to formulate and/or reactivate their DTFs to
constitute sub-committees for the 6 core preparedness
Fig. 1 Showing the National Task Force and relationship to its subcommittees, District Task Forces and Rapid Response Teams
Aceng et al. Globalization and Health           (2020) 16:24 Page 3 of 12
components and coordinate interventions at district
level. The DTFs comprised the district political, civic, se-
curity, and health leadership as well as technical advisors
from different partners working in the districts.
As a result of the complexity of the EVD situation in
DRC, civil unrest and refugee influx, several national de-
velopment partners became involved in EVD prepared-
ness. The NTF, with support from WHO, developed a
partners’ coordination matrix to avoid duplication of ef-
forts, facilitate identification of preparedness gaps, sup-
port monitoring of implementation of the preparedness
plan and realise the importance of impact on competing
health interests. The matrix specified who should be
doing what, where, and when (also known as the 4Ws),
as well as the EVD preparedness goal, objectives, strat-
egies, budget, funding sources, funding gaps, donors,
and implementing agencies in the respective high-risk
districts. Guided by this matrix, the MoH and partner
institutions provided district-level financial and technical
support for preparedness activities (Figs. 2 and 3).
Figure 2 shows total amount of money spent by each
implementing partner while Fig. 3 shows the contribu-
tion by each donor to the preparedness efforts.
The matrix was updated regularly based on feedback
from NTF members. A dashboard was developed and
updated promptly to display the financial and technical
progress as well as the 4Ws.
Risk classification of districts
The NTF classified district EVD transmission risk into 3
categories. Category 1 included 20 high-risk districts that
have physical borders, direct routes, and refugee influx
from the affected provinces in DRC as well as the central
business disticts of Kampala Capital City and Wakiso.
Category 2 included 10 moderate-risk districts that have
physical borders with DRC but no direct route to EVD-
affected regions, and category 3 included low-risk dis-
tricts in the rest of the country (Fig. 4).
District rapid response and risk assessments
The NTF deployed the NRRT to the districts to conduct
rapid risk assessments and report within the first 12 h of
deployment followed by subsequent updates as the out-
break situation evolved. The NTF adapted and used the
WHO EVD preparedness checklist to assess the districts’
level of preparedness. The checklist is composed of 11
key components and core capacities and tasks for both
districts and health facilities that are required for a dis-
trict to be operationally ready [10]. Through face-to-face
interviews with key informants and discussions with the
DRRT, the NRRT scored activities under each core cap-
acity of preparedness. The assessment team verified re-
sponses by looking at documented evidence and
implementation of the recommended core capacities at
the district and health facility level. The NRRT held
group discussions with health facility teams on epi-
demiological surveillance, case management, IPC, la-
boratory and contact tracing. Scores were assigned to
each of the core capacity components (green for
complete/in place and red for incomplete/not yet in
place) and then percentages of the total tasks that were
completed for each core capacity were computed for
Fig. 2 National Budget and Financial Contribution to EVD preparedness by Implementing Partner
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each district. Any district with a level of preparedness
component at ≤50% was considered unprepared (red),
between 50 and 75% was considered as fairly ready (yel-
low), and those above 75% were considered prepared for
that component. The NRRT used the assessment results
to identify capacity gaps for additional support to
strengthen alert and response in the 30 high and moder-
ate risk districts.
Risk mapping
To establish DRC population movements and patterns
across the DRC-Uganda border, the Population Con-
nectivity across Borders (Pop-CAB) tool developed by
US CDC was used to document, record, analyze, and
map risks associated with population movements across
borders. The NRRT held key informant interviews with
the District Health Team (DHT), which included the
District Health Officers, Surveillance Focal Persons,
Health Inspectors and Health Educators, and local
leaders at known border PoEs and along priority porous
borders. Several official and non-official high-risk cross-
ing points for population movement from DRC across
border districts were identified. Trained facilitators also
interviewed Township Chairpersons, Town Clerks, Sub-
county Chiefs, Mayors, and transport operatives in the
high-risk locations. In addition, Focus Group Discus-
sions (FGDs) with village leaders, community health
workers in the cited high-risk locations for DRC popula-
tion were held. The FGDs were guided by an adapted
PopCAB FGD guide to gather information about the
type of people crossing the border, their points of origin,
congregation points, reasons for entering Uganda,
duration of their stay and destinations. GPS coordinates
for each of the locations were recorded. We developed
summaries from key informant interviews and focus
group discussions aided with sketch maps to track cross-
border movements and indicate key locations for the
DRC population. The facilitators integrated participatory
mapping with spatially-accurate, printed maps in the key
informant interviews and focus group discussions to
identify location information for priority points of inter-
est and travel routes. Respondents described population
movement patterns associated with refugees who leave
the Uganda settlements to visit their relatives in DRC
and return back to Uganda. In addition, they described
the patterns of persons newly-arriving from the DRC to
established refugee reception centers and resettlements
areas in Uganda such as Kyangwali in Hoima District or
Kyaka II in Kyegegwa District, as well as DRC traders
traveling across Lakes Albert and George to major mar-
kets in towns in the Ugandan border and non-border
districts for business, and others who fly directly to En-
tebbe International Airport from Goma, Eastern DRC.
The DRRT used the results to identify several official
and non-official high-risk border locations with popula-
tion movement from DRC into border districts. These
exercises revealed multiple DRC travelers’ destinations
to towns as far as Uganda’s capital city of Kampala.
A mapping exercise was conducted by the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM) to establish
the numbers, locations, and traveler flow of the numer-
ous non-official border crossing points that exist be-
tween the DRC and Uganda through which people travel
for social, business, and health reasons. This enabled
Fig. 3 Financial Contribution to EVD preparedness by Donor
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selection of relevant PoEs for the establishment of
screening, isolation and notification systems. Some of
the busy border PoEs receive about 5000 people daily;
however, the numbers increase tremendously and can
reach over 20,000 people during market days, and this
increases workload on screeners.
The national EVD response plan and budget
With support from development partners and relevant
stakeholders, the NTF developed the National EVD
Contingency Plan to address the identified gaps in pre-
paredness, and to support timely detection, response,
and immediate containment of a potential EVD case in
Uganda. This plan was developed in line with guidance
provided in the International Health Regulations (IHR)
2005 for countries to develop core capacities to prevent,
protect against, and rapidly respond to public health
threats, including EVD. The plan was developed based
on the rapid assessment preparedness reports, past expe-
riences, and lessons learnt during the previous EVD out-
breaks in Uganda [11]. The plan was also developed
based on the One Health approach to Global Health Se-
curity at both national and subnational levels. This ap-
proach requires coordination across multiple sectors of
government including human and animal health, agricul-
ture, wildlife, water and environment, security, immigra-
tion and law enforcement. The NTF engaged several
agencies including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of
Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF),
Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE), Uganda
Wildlife Authority (UWA) under the Ministry of Tour-
ism, Wildlife and Antiquities (MTWA), Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs (MoIA), Ministry of Security (MoS), and
the private sector among others. The EVD preparedness
and response plan highlighted objectives, strategies, spe-
cific activities, and a performance and monitoring
Fig. 4 Geographical distribution of the 30 EVD high-risk districts of Uganda, 2018
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framework for each of the 11 components of prepared-
ness and was costed accordingly. It highlighted a pack-
age of interventions for the districts in the 3 risk
categories.
Cross-border collaboration
After several cross-border contacts were made and
points of entry coordination exchanges took place at
local levels, the NTF and MoH engaged with the DRC
Ministère de la Santé Publique (Ministry of Public
Health) to convene a cross-border health meeting. At-
tendees included the East African countries at risk of
introduction of EVD cases from the DRC in October
2018. Following this meeting, a bilateral ministerial
meeting was held in Goma, DRC, in December 2018.
The first meeting was designed to formalize cross-
border collaboration and local-level exchange of infor-
mation between affected countries, meanwhile the sec-
ond meeting was meant to result in developing and
signing of the Uganda-DRC Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU) on cross-border collaboration for public
health preparedness and response. The MoU enabled es-
tablishment of four surveillance zones between Uganda
and the DRC.
Surveillance
The NRRT trained DHTs, health and non-health front-
line workers including members of security forces, Vil-
lage Health Teams (VHTs) and political leaders on EVD
case definitions and distributed copies of case investiga-
tion forms and contact tracing guidelines in assessed
health facilities. Health facilities formed surveillance
teams to heighten surveillance and active case search in
order to detect any alert or suspect cases. Volunteers
were trained on EVD screening at border PoEs and refu-
gee reception centers with support from various part-
ners. A PoE coordination committee developed a PoE
toolkit which was approved by the NTF and adapted for
use by MoH. The PoE teams screened everyone crossing
into Uganda from DRC with infrared thermometers for
body temperature, including all refugees at reception
centers. Persons found with elevated body temperatures
(> 38 degrees Celsius) were further screened for Ebola-
like symptoms.
The NRRT trained laboratory health workers on speci-
men collection from suspected EVD cases and triple
packaging for transportation to the Uganda Virus Re-
search Institute (UVRI) for testing. With support from
partners, ambulances were stationed in each of the 20
category 1 high-risk districts for rapid transportation of
specimens to the UVRI Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (VHF)
Program laboratory in Entebbe, ensuring delivery of
samples within 24 h of collection. In addition, the MoH
conducted a pilot of an electronic system to track
collected samples to improve the monitoring of labora-
tory results turnaround time. Other actions undertaken
in the preparedness period include modifications of the
specimen collection, sample chains of custody and pack-
ing list forms. These modifications aimed to strengthen
the existing biosecurity mechanisms of the National La-
boratory Services. By end of May 2019, 641 Ebola alerts
were verified countrywide (Fig. 5).
Although up through 9 June, no specimen collected
from an alert tested Ebola positive, other VHF pathogens
were detected in samples from 25 alert cases including
Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever [12] and Rift Valley
Fever [13].
Case management
The DTFs identified clinical staff including clinicians
and community health workers whom the NRRT trained
on EVD case definitions, transmission, clinical presenta-
tion, community surveillance, reporting, IPC, and case
management including dignified safe burial. The train-
ings included simulation exercises such as donning and
doffing of EVD PPE for case management and safe bur-
ial. During the trainings, the NRRT disseminated EVD
guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
for patient management and, safe and dignified burial.
The NRRT also helped the DTFs to designate and set-
up EVD isolation units at specified hospitals and health
facilities ready to provide care to EVD patients. With
support from partners, MoH constructed ten Ebola
Treatment Units (ETUs) at designated hospitals in high-
risk districts.
The NRRT conducted IPC assessments and instituted
hand-washing and disinfection measures and positioned
hand-washing stations at major health care facilities, of-
ficial and high-risk unofficial PoEs, refugee transit and
reception centers, and other relevant public places in the
30 high and moderate risk districts. With support from
partners, MoH trained district-based IPC trainers who
trained and mentored all relevant health facility workers
on IPC practices in handling suspect, probable and con-
firmed EVD patients including safe waste management,
and safe dignified burials.
Logistics and supplies
The NTF Logistics Sub-committee conducted logistics
assessments in at least five of the high-risk districts to
determine a baseline, and then used the data for fore-
casting and quantification for medical, IPC, PPE, and la-
boratory needs for the districts. With support from the
NRRT, the DTFs developed emergency contingency
plans and budgets to facilitate EVD preparedness activ-
ities, which were reviewed and approved by the NTF.
The MoH with support from partner agencies purchased
and distributed PPE and other relevant supplies to all
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designated district hospitals and health facilities for case
management. A number of development partners and
international agencies supported the MoH financially to
avail the preparedness logistics and supplies to the
districts.
Risk communication
The NTF generated a press statement which was read by
the Minister of Health on 3rd August 2018 to inform
the public about the EVD outbreak in DRC and increase
alertness for surveillance in the 30 high- and moderate-
risk districts and the rest of the country. The NTF Risk
Communication Subcommittee developed subsequent
press releases for the Minister of Health, The committee
also developed the risk communication plan, radio spot
messages, reviewed, printed and translated IEC materials
which were translated in fifteen most spoken local lan-
guages in the 30 high-and moderate-risk districts across
the western border of Uganda to ensure reach to the
general public. Information specified signs and symp-
toms of EVD, the need to seek urgent medical care in
case symptoms arise, and the importance of safe burial
of the dead. EVD information was disseminated regularly
through local newspapers, popular radio, and television
stations. In addition, the DTFs disseminated IEC on
EVD through regular radio talk shows, spot messages,
and posters in high-risk communities. They also sup-
ported trained community volunteers to carry out com-
munal and door-to-door EVD health education.
Vaccination
The NTF sought ethical and institutional approval for
prophylactic use of the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine currently
used in the DRC based on its demonstrated protective ef-
ficacy against the Ebola virus-Zaire type. This particular
vaccine was being administered in DRC and had demon-
strated positive protective results and potency against the
Ebola virus-Zaire type [12]. The aim of the initial Ebola
vaccination campaign was to protect frontline health and
non-health workers in Uganda under a compassionate-use
strategy to protect persons at potential risk for EVD in ad-
vance of an outbreak. Once approval was granted, the
MoH, with support from the WHO, secured 3000 vaccine
doses, established and trained national vaccination teams,
organized cold chain logistics, selected districts and most-
at-risk workers in health care facilities, PoEs and other
Fig. 5 Map showing locations of verified EVD alerts in Uganda, March 2019
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locations (laboratories, airport, etc.), and commenced vol-
untary vaccination. Vaccination proceeded according to a
site-by-site plan ranking highest- to lowest-risk sites for
EVD case introduction from the DRC. The vaccination
campaign planning committee used PopCAB results from
identified districts to inform their decisions about which
heath care facilities and Poe to target during the initial
vaccination campaign. An additional 3000 doses of vac-
cines were later secured to scale up the vaccination exer-
cise. By the end of April 2019, Uganda had vaccinated
4419 health workers in 13 high-risk districts (Fig. 6.
The vaccination team in their wisdom selected health
workers they considered more at risk compared to
others and targeted those for vaccination rather than
vaccinate all health workers. This was the first time
Ebola vaccination was conducted as part of a country’s
preparedness response.
Full-scale simulation exercise
A WHO Joint Monitoring and Assessment of EVD pre-
paredness in Uganda conducted in December 2018
showed significant progress, with up to 92% readiness
nationally. The MoH therefore recommended a full-
scale simulation exercise to test the operational capabil-
ities of all components of the preparedness and response
plan.
A full-scale simulation exercise (FSX) was conducted
in April 2019 to test the preparedness and response sys-
tems at three levels of operation: community, district,
and national. The exercise was conducted in a highly
stressful environment, simulating actual response condi-
tions. The exercise simulated three suspected cases of
EVD. The first case tested the response systems at a des-
ignated land PoE in Kasese District (Mpondwe Border
Point), and referral to an Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU),
while the second came through Entebbe International
Airport. The third case tested community surveillance
and reception of an EVD suspected case in a non-ETU
facility in Kasese District, and subsequently safe and dig-
nified burial when the patient died. The coordination
structures at national and district levels were also tested.
In all scenarios, detection of a suspected EVD case was
timely, though reporting from the community to the na-
tional level was delayed. The simulation exercise identi-
fied strengths and gaps in the development and
implementation of preparedness and response measures.
The exercise also identified areas for improvement in co-
ordination of the response at district level, safe referral
of EVD suspected cases, infection prevention and con-
trol, and management of severely ill patients. It was rec-
ommended that preparedness efforts prioritize skilling
health care providers through intensified supervision,
mentorships and drills.
Key challenges
The conflation of political instability and rebel activ-
ities coupled with community mistrust in the out-
break response in Eastern DRC have made it very
difficult for the DRC and its partners to control what
has now become the second-largest and -longest EVD
outbreak recorded in history [14]. As a result, the
outbreak continues to rage on and on many months
after it was declared, and the number of confirmed
EVD cases in the DRC have been increasing, with
new cases being declared closer to the Ugandan
border [15]. At the same time, Uganda continues to
receive a large influx of people from DRC through of-
ficial and unofficial PoEs, posing a huge strain on the
border screening efforts put in place. Moreover, EVD
preparedness efforts are showing multiple signs of fa-
tigue from all sides and is thus becoming increasingly
hard to sustain, with funding and resources still inad-
equate to cover all high-risk districts, and yet the
Fig. 6 Number of health workers vaccinated in 13 high risk districts of Uganda, April 2019
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need to sustain the preparedness momentum at both
national and district levels is greater than ever.
Discussion
A day after the official declaration of the 10th EVD out-
break in the DRC, Uganda’s MoH initiated a quick EVD
preparedness response by activating the NTF and
PHEOC to a response level and mandating its members
and partners to plan, mobilize resources and coordinate
implementation of the full range of EVD preparedness
pillar activities. With support from several partner orga-
nizations, Uganda was able to activate the NTF and cre-
ate an active IMS and a partner coordination matrix,
mobilize resources and carry out preparedness activities
in 30 designated high- and moderate-risk districts on its
western border with DRC as well as on adjacent borders
with Rwanda and South Sudan and the central urban
hubs of Kampala and Entebbe, linked to population
movements from and to the DRC’s outbreak hotspots.
In addition, Uganda has established multi-sectoral and
multidisciplinary national and district task forces, and
technical subcommittees for each preparedness pillar
that advise the NTF and act as liaisons between the NTF
and the high- and moderate-risk districts. These quick
actions were most influenced by Uganda’s experiences
with four previous EVD outbreaks [16]. With this ex-
perience and support from partners, activation was quick
and was established with relative ease. The lasting im-
pact of these efforts is a high likelihood that it could
generate momentum towards national and partners’
commitments to support long-term emergency pre-
paredness for future outbreaks.
The WHO recommends EVD preparedness activities
in countries with close proximity to EVD epicenters to
enable them respond should there be any importation of
EVD cases. Uganda is among nine priority countries
neighboring DRC since the present 10th EVD outbreak
started [17]. After the 2014 EVD outbreak in West Af-
rica, the WHO proposed an agenda for changing its
strategy in the face of epidemic and pandemic threats,
which has been largely accepted by WHO Member
States, including Uganda. Through this agenda, WHO
was able to support Uganda with a quick, proactive,
result-driven, resourced and well-equipped team. Indeed,
Uganda, supported by its internationally recognized Na-
tional VHF Program at UVRI, was the first neighboring
country in the WHO-AFRO region to initiate and en-
gage in a fully-fledged emergency preparedness and re-
sponse program, which also included prophylactic use of
Ebola vaccination.
The preparedness assessment found that all 30 high-
and moderate-risk Ugandan districts had less than a 50%
score for EVD readiness at baseline. It also found that
the average score for EVD preparedness was highest in
laboratory and lowest in budgets, safe burials, and con-
tact tracing. These findings were similar to WHO’s ini-
tial assessments done across EVD African countries
neighboring DRC during the 2018 EVD outbreak as well
as what was found by WHO in the 2015 EVD prepared-
ness assessment for west African countries (23). The
UNHCR, IOM and Medical Teams International (MTI)
that provide active health, border, and mobility care for
refugees in the settlements had already put in place mea-
sures to strengthen EVD preparedness such as EVD
trainings, EVD screening, IPC measures, and dissemin-
ation of EVD IEC materials.
Following the IDSR guidelines, the national surveil-
lance system was strengthened with training of all na-
tional and district surveillance focal persons and
facilitation for timely detection, reporting, and investiga-
tion of EVD alerts with focus on cross-border surveil-
lance and early patient triage at high-risk referral health
care facilities. The EOC continues to provide timely in-
formation about disease epidemics while the NTF closely
continues to guide, monitor, and supervise the prepared-
ness activities. The country has built capacity and estab-
lished a good laboratory network within districts,
regional referral hospitals, and at the national level to
collect, package, store and transport samples to the Na-
tional VHF Program laboratory at UVRI. The VHF Pro-
gram laboratory at UVRI is a regional diagnostic referral
laboratory for VHF and routinely screens all suspect
specimens for Ebola (Bundibugyo, Sudan), Marburg,
CCHF and RVF. There is also well-developed local cap-
acity for social mobilisation during epidemics with en-
gagement of political, local and religious leaders. Many
health workers have been trained in EVD case manage-
ment and provided with updated guidelines and SOPs
with support from several partner agencies.
Nine months after the declaration of the 10th EVD
outbreak in the DRC, Uganda continues to conduct pre-
paredness activities to prevent introduction and spread
of EVD into the country. While WHO continues to sup-
port this effort, the duration and extent of this outbreak
has come as a surprise to many. As a result, govern-
ments, donors, and partners have all been stretched to a
point where the preparedness strategy needs to be revis-
ited. Specifically, it is important to redefine strategies in
order to both maintain the readiness momentum at a
time where the risk of outbreak spillover has increased,
as well as to plan for the human, technical, and financial
resources needed to balance this protracted effort with
the rest of the national health security agenda. This
agenda requires at least equal time, efforts, and re-
sources as EVD preparedness, yet the capacity of an at-
risk country like Uganda is limited and cannot address
both needs fully. A WHO meeting on Strengthening
Partnership for Improving Ebola Preparedness and
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Readiness took place at the end of April 2019 and this
issue was addressed.
Next steps
As the EVD outbreak continues in DRC, the risk of
cross-border transmission remains imminent. Subse-
quently, the country has plans to expand and intensify
preparedness activities to additional districts, with a spe-
cial focus on the use of universal precautions and ways
to strengthen and sustain IPC practices at all health fa-
cilities in high-risk districts. The broad EVD prepared-
ness workgroup continues to strengthen cross-border
collaboration and to engage the community in door-to-
door risk communication and surveillance in all high-
risk districts. There is also need to accelerate vaccination
of at-risk frontline health workers in the other high-risk
districts. The MoH, with support from partner agencies,
has started to conduct drills and simulation exercises in
the most at-risk districts bordering the DRC to evaluate
preparedness and response capacity. The MoH also
plans to improve sample transportation and re-establish
a national border health unit that has been inactive for
many years.
Conclusions
Within the first month of declaration of the 10th EVD
outbreak in DRC, Uganda’s MoH had established a
strong coordination and surveillance system to effect-
ively alert and respond to any EVD suspect case and to
mitigate risk of importation of EVD into Uganda. With
continued technical and financial support from many
partners, the country has strengthened EVD prepared-
ness and timely detection, investigation and response to
EVD alerts. Sustained efforts are required to support re-
freshing of health workers, provision of infection control
supplies, maintenance of infrastructure, provision of
equipment for case referral and isolation, regular drills
and simulation exercises in key technical areas, contin-
ued risk communication, community engagement, re-
source mapping as well as countrywide coordination.
Addendum
On June 10, Uganda detected its first cases of EVD as a
result of a spillover event from the DRC. While the de-
tails of the cases will be presented in another paper,
cases were quickly recognized, specimens safely collected
and efficiently transported for diagnostic testing and
confirmation at UVRI. Case patients were rapidly relo-
cated to an ETU for isolation and care. As of 22 June
2019, no secondary transmission from these three cases
have occurred in Uganda, a clear demonstration of the
effectiveness of the Uganda preparedness program.
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